"Reason", hikmat, philosophy, knowledge, and psychic faculty, are divided, in Greek philosophy, into theoretical and practical ones. Muslim philosophers diverge on the nature and function of these two types of reason. Some of them consider them of the same nature, i.e. comprehension and reasoning. According to them, the difference lies in the fact that the object of first one is knowledge, and that of the second one is action. Still some others put the burden of both on theoretical reason. Some philosophers consider theoretical reason an instance of cognition and practical reason an instance of action, and they deem their cooperation as leading to a mixture of knowledge and action.According to the common view, practical reason gets to particular knowledge by deliberating on theoretical understandings, so that it can guide psychic powers to action. Theoretical reason enables one to understand facts, while practical reason guides one to manage one's personal, as well as social, affairs. The author thinks that it is "heart", and not practical reason, that motivates one toward a set of actions.

The subject matter of this article is not to determine the priority of reason to heart or privacy of rationality to love, but find out the answers to these questions: what is role of reason and rational knowledge in attaining mystical intuitive visions? How far does the horizon of rational knowledge extend from perspective of Ibn Arabi? Given the fact that mysticism is arena for esoteric vision and disclosure, is there any room for reason to play active part? Last but not least, how do proponents and opponents of reason define the similarities and differences in the subject in question?It is worth noting that reason is clearly different from rational knowledge but in the present article it is used in the sense of the latter.

Introduction In criminal law, balancing individual and social rights is a kind of justice that must be taken into account in criminal proceedings. In modern criminal law, requirements such as avoiding violations of physical rights, etc., are governed by ways and means of obtaining and collecting evidence, all of which are rooted in the principle of the legitimacy of reason. But in the meantime, there are a number of contexts that influence these requirements and cause authorities to take advantage of methods that more likely to depart from the norms of principle of the legitimacy when collecting evidence of crime. The present paper examines the aforementioned contexts. Methodology Documentary and library methods were used to study the subject. Accordingly, the criminal law doctrines that have been written in the field of proof of the criminal case in various books and articles which surveyed the principle of the legitimacy of reason and the legitimacy of reason have examined; They were analyzed and described without using statistical indices with descriptive-analytic method. Findings Despite the use of illegitimate reasoning methods and incompatible practices with our ethical, religious and legal foundations, but existing facts, such as the lack of specialized crime discovery facilities, lead reason gaining to use these methods; In a way, the criminal prosecutor knowing that the police have used unauthorized methods to obtain evidence and cites the evidence presented in this way. Conclusion In criminal law, the principle of the legitimacy of reason gaining is one of the most important and fundamental principles of protecting, guarding and supervising criminal proceedings in order to fulfill their individual and social security. however, there are a number of contextual contexts in the criminal justice system that lead reason obtaining authorities, including the police, to depart from the principle of reason legitimacy. Predicting systematic and systematic laws for the study of the cause will remove the problem of personal and social security.

The contingent is always a kind of menace for metaphysical systems. Kant uses die Zufälligkeit, and we first must consider its implications in his theoretical philosophy in order to find his position on the menace of contingency for the system of science (Wissenschaft). Our study shows that Kant has in different occasions used this term (die Zufälligkeit) in some different but related meanings, Tracing Kant’s usage of the term through its Critique of pure Reason, this paper examines how Kant have confronted to the situation of the accidental in the necessary system of science. The conclusion is that Kant does not resolve this tension, because on the one hand he ignores contingency in favor of necessity, and claims that a system as a pure science required to avoid from the contingency in his transcendental system, and on the other hand, he gives a place to contingency in order to be able to explain how reason progresses in its series of dialectical inferences. Therefore, Kant only has dissolved and not solved the crucial tension, and its sublimation is possible only through another non-Kantian models of dialectic.

Criticism of theoretical reason in the history of Islamic mysticism and in the schools of thought of Khorasani and Ibn Arabi are reflected in two different ways. In Khorasani mysticism emphasis has been laid on its incapability to accompany love in the course of wayfaring. This approach is mainly based on incapability of reason to encourage practice and involvement in the realm of practical mysticism. In theoretical mysticism emphasis is laid on incapability of reason in the field of understanding and attention to the limitations of theoretical reason in understanding the truths. There are arenas of the truth beyond the understanding of reason which should be understood through other ways related to those truths. Sadruddin Qunavi, a renowned figure in the field of theoretical mysticism, through relying on arguments based on philosophy and mysticism has tried to prove the incapability of theoretical reason. His arguments have been collected by Hamzeh Fanari. Attempts have been made in the present paper to review and assess the said arguments to find out their capability for proving this hypothesis.

Clarifying the role of reason as a source of knowledge and its connection to the theoretical or epistemic authority of the Quran, particularly within the framework of rationality, is a crucial discourse in contemporary times. This study seeks to analyze the relationship between reason and the Quran’s theoretical authority using a qualitative, descriptive-analytical approach and thematic interpretation. The findings of this research elucidate the interplay between reason and knowledge-oriented inquiry in the pursuit of divine obedience and the realization of a monotheistic society. Knowledge is portrayed as intrinsically linked to purity, wisdom, and guidance, encompassing both worldly and otherworldly sciences. Additionally, the expansion of interpretative understanding includes dimensions such as empathy, fluidity, objectification, and the evolution of theoretical inquiry based on rationality through a contextualized comprehension ofthe Quranic text. This relationship between reason and scientific inquiry is examined through contemplation of Quranic verses without preconceived impositions, acknowledging that the Quran speaks through logic and demonstrative proof. It also entails the integration of contemporary scholarly discussions in the interpretation of Quranic verses, alongside employing the Quran to address emerging questions in various fields of knowledge. Accordingly, the theoretical authority of the Quran, grounded in rationality, signifies that the pressing intellectual concerns of society can be extracted from the Quran through an active and systematic engagement, establishing a dynamic interplay between reason and the Quran’s theoretical authority.

Since Ethics is one of the subdivisions of practical wisdom, Islamic philosopher’s view point is very important in explanation of theoretical and practical reason.This paper is going to analyze the distinction between practical and theoretical reason from Haeri’s point of view. In order to finding the roots of his issue, at the beginning we will propose the idea of philosophers like Farabi, Ibn Sina, Qotb- al- din Razi, Mulla Sadra and Sabzevari; then we will have a review on Haeri’s view and his interpretation of Ibn Sina’s one.With finding and highlighting of contradictions and differences in Ib Sina’s view point, He tries to resolve the antinomies undermining in his ideas about distinction between practical and theoretical reason. He also stands against the view of some thinkers, such as Qotb- al-Din Razi, and some Asuliyyin like Mozaffar, and challenges their ideas.According to his philosophical views, Haery also explicates the distinction between propositions of practical and theoretical reason. Moreover, he tries to clarify the meaning of the word ‘reason’ and show that how theoretical reason converts to practical.

According to Muslim philosophers, what distinguishes human soul from that of animal are theoretical and practical reason. But there is more than one interpretation of theoretical and practical reason among these philosophers and sometimes even in the works of a single philosopher.The paper aims at clarifying the meaning of practical reason from the viewpoint of Avicenna (ibn -Sina).Referring to Avicenna's works four terms and expressions as to the practical reason can be identified. In some of these expressions, the practical reason has only the function of conceiving general or particular practical propositions. In some others, it has, besides conceptual function, a practical one. Examining these four expressions, it becomes clear that none of them comes in accord with the two expressions prevalent among Muslim philosophers. The article ends with an attempt to bring back the four expressions to a single comprehensive one.

One may say that The Open Society and Its Enemies (OS) offered in 1945 the first complete elaboration of the general approach proposed by Karl Popper, namely his ‘critical rationalism’, a bold generalization of the fallibilist falsificationism in the domain of the empirical sciences masterly proposed in Logik der Forschung (1934). The political content of The OS has been critically discussed. Nevertheless, not all people insist on the equally important moral dimension of the book, giving it its unity, I submit. Without morality, no critical discussion, no reason, no open society, let us say in a nutshell. I would argue that according to Popper, a strictly Christian morality of love would not be the appropriate emotional companion of critical rationalism, but that the less demanding moral emotion of sympathy or compassion is perhaps necessary to give it its force against violence. I give some support to this line of argument. In my view, Popper proposed a somewhat unarticulated critical rationalist ‘emotivism’ of sorts. The emotion of compassion is necessary for triggering our moral decisions and values, which are the ultimate basis of the choice for a reason against violence.

Sheikh Hur al-Amili, a famous traditionalist of the second half of the 11th century, is both a traditionalist and a theologian who uses various methods to infer religious teachings and defend them against the opponents. He uses traditional and rational methods to achieve this aim. Addressing the position of reason from the perspective of Sheikh Hur al-Amili, the present paper reviews his various theological works and examines the functions of reason in his theological thoughts. The research shows through the documentary method that Sheikh al-Amili regards transmitted sciences as the main source for the inference of beliefs, but in practice, like other theologians, he has recourse to the threefold functions of reason. He makes use of the independent functions of reason, namely theoretical and practical reason, as well as the dependent function of reason, namely, instrumental reason. He attempted to infer religious teachings of Islam and Shiism by using various rational and traditional methods and defend them. He believes that there is no conflict between instrumental reason and the transmition of hadiths and that in case of conflict between theoretical and practical reason and traditions, the opposing traditions have to be allegorically interpreted.